Global Administrative Law: Global Governance Of The Global Positioning System And Galileo by Han, Sang Wook Daniel
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE OF THE GLOBAL POSITIONING
SYSTEM AND GALILEO
Sang Wook Daniel Han*
I. THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM-GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURE OVERVIEW ............................................................. 572
II. GALILEO--GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OVERVIEW .................. 576
III. A CCOUNTABILITY ...................................................................... 580
IV. LIABILITY-LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY ..................................... 581
V. NON-DECISIONAL PARTICIPATION ............................................. 586
VI. TRANSPARENCY ......................................................................... 587
V II. LEGITIM ACY .............................................................................. 589
VIII. ALTERNATIVE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
FOR THE G N SS .......................................................................... 589
IX . C ONCLUSION ............................................................................. 593
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a space-based positioning,
navigation and timing (PNT) system originally developed by the Depart-
ment of Defense of the United States government in early 1970s.1 It was
originally intended for military purposes, such as guiding missiles precisely
to targets and locating and coordinating friendly units. But increasingly, the
GPS is being used for extensive civilian purposes as well-such as
navigation of vehicles, trains, airplanes and ships, telecommunications,
search and rescue, land and maritime survey of many different kinds, and
optimization of the transfer of electricity along power lines.2 With the rise
of importance of the GPS in ordinary lives, there has been an increasing
concern over unilateral dominance of the governance of GPS by the United
States government. There is fear that the U.S. military may discontinue or
degrade the GPS signals for U.S. national security reasons or some states
may arbitrarily be denied access to the GPS system by the U.S.
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1. For a brief coverage of the development story of GPS, see generally Thomas A. Herring,
The Global Positioning System, 274 SCI. AM. 44 (1996).
2. THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE
FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM, at 4 (2005).
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government,3 despite the U.S. government's vigorous denial of such
possibility.
4
These sovereignty concerns, as well as economic attractions, prompted
the European Union (EU) to develop its own space-based PNT system
called Galileo, which is expected to be fully operational by 2008. With the
advent of Galileo, the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System
(GLONASS), which is a pre-existing Russian counterpart to the GPS, seeks
to wake up from slumber and improve its capabilities. The GPS also seeks
to improve its operational capabilities and governance structure.
In light of these extensive impacts the PNT systems have on civilian
lives, as well as the dynamic changes each system is going under, this
article aims to examine the level of accountability of the GPS and Galileo
as global administrative bodies under the framework of Global Administra-
tive Law (GAL). This article will examine the internal governance
structures of the GPS and Galileo, and analyze the standards of trans-
parency, public participation and liability adopted by each body.5 Given
that the GPS is a domestic regulatory agency making decisions on issues of
global concerns and that Galileo is an administration by hybrid public-
private arrangement,6 this article will study which global governance
structure would suit the oncoming Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) best-between a formal multilateral institution and market
competition structure.
I. THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM-
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OVERVIEW
The U.S. Air Force finances and operates the GPS, which consists of
twenty-four or more GPS satellites and monitoring stations located around
the world.7 The generated navigation messages are continuously broad-
casted from each of the GPS satellites to the users around the world, who
receive and process the messages to determine their position and time to
3. Paul B. Larsen, Issues Relating to Civilian and Military Dual Uses of GNSS, 17 SPACE
POL'Y 111,111 (2001).
4. See Spaced Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing, National Executive Committee,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://pnt.gov/public/faq.shtml (last visited Aug. 29, 2007). The
Department of Defense signed the official commitment to civil performance several years ago (SPS
Signal Specification/Performance Standard) to make GPS available for civilian purpose. See DEFENSE
SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 10.
5. For GAL coverage, see generally Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart,
The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).
6. See id. at 20-22.
7. THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE, supra note 2.
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within a few meters and a few nanoseconds.8 Its civil signal is freely
available to all and the military signals are encrypted for exclusive access
by the U.S. and allied military forces.9 As well as its extensive current
civilian uses, its potential uses have wide implications for transportation,
energy, surveying, law enforcement, engineering and science, environment,
search and rescue, recreation, and wide business areas.'0
The governing structure of the GPS has been interdepartmental within
the U.S. government." The GPS has been governed by a National Space-
Based PNT Executive Committee (Committee), which is co-chaired by
Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Transportation, reflecting dual military-
civilian usages since December 2004. Representatives from the Department
of Defense, Department of Transportation, Department of State,
Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland Security, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and NASA participate in the Committee meetings. The Committee
is assisted by an independent Advisory Board sponsored by NASA and the
Committee's coordination office is hosted by the Department of Commerce,
which provides a contact point for inquiries regarding PNT policy and
maintains PNT's website.
2
The PNT National Policy requires the Committee to meet at least twice
per year, and in fact the Committee had four meetings between its first
meeting in February 2005 and June 2006. The PNT National Policy
requires the Committee to give appropriate consideration to security and
civil interests in decision-making related to the GPS and to coordinate
individual department's PNT program plans, requirements, budgets, and
policies.'
3
8. THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 26. For GPS and privacy
issues, see generally Kristen E. Edmundson, Global. Positioning System Implants: Must Consumer
Privacy Be Lost in Order for People to Be Found?, 38 IND. L. REV. 207 (2005).
9. THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE, supra note 2. GPS provides two levels of
service: the Standard Positioning Service (SPS) and the Precise Positioning Service (PPS). The former
is available to all GPS users worldwide with no direct charge. The PPS is an encrypted service available
for U.S. military use. MARTIN U. RIPPLE & ALEXIS VIDAL, ION GNSS 18TH INT'L TECH MEETING OF
THE SATELLITE DIVISION, NEW U.S. GPS POLICY FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 407, 408 (2005),
http://satjournal.tcom.ohiou.edu/issue9/PDF/New%/2OUS%20GPS%2OPolicy.pdf (last visited Oct. 20,_
2007).
10. See EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, GALILEO: THE EUROPEAN PROGRAMME FOR GLOBAL
NAVIGATION SERVICES 15-19 (Andrew Wilson ed., 2005).
II. THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 12.
12. See NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR SPACE BASED POSITIONING, NAVIGATION,
AND TIMING,, http://pnt.gov/orgchart.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
13. NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR SPACE BASED POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND
TIMING, U.S. SPACE-BASED POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING POLICY (2004),
http://pnt.gov/policy [hereinafter PNT Policy] (last visited Oct. II, 2007).
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The Defense Science Board has recently carried out an internal review
of the GPS. 14  A subsequent Task Force Report (Report) published in
October 2005 pointed to the governance structure as one of the serious
issues facing the GPS. 15 The Report lpointed to the lack of comprehensive
governing architecture over the GPS' and lack of commanding authority,
hierarchy, and clear attribution of responsibility.' 7
The Report reveals many important aspects about the GPS governance
structure that are relevant for analysis of accountability under GAL. First,
in addition to the U.S. government's own monitoring networks, which
measure military signal fidelity, the Report recommends the direct, in-
dependent and continuous monitoring by the existing worldwide civil,
commercial, and scientific GPS monitoring networks for civilian signals.'"
Historically, monitoring information sourced by civilian bodies was ignored
by the U.S. government because of doubt over integrity and fidelity of such
sources, which have been overcome by successful lengthy operation of
these civilian bodies.' 9
The Report also recommends the storage of historic data to measure
their performance and to update the "GPS Civil Performance Standard" that
had been devised by the U.S. government professionals several years ago.
The Report recommends the measurement of historic data against the
Performance Standard for civilian signals as well.2°
Secondly, the Report recommends the strengthening of the effective-
ness of the Committee's Coordination Office and designation of a single
focal point within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The focal point is
responsible for all GPS policy and oversight matters, including clearly
defined relationships with the Joint Staff and Services regarding GPS
operations and acquisition.2'
Thirdly, the Report acknowledges a perception that the military exerts
undue influence in decisions affecting civil GPS.22 The Report suggests
such perception is false and also states that users are not institutionally
14. The Defense Science Board, an author of the report, is an independent federal advisory
committee to the U.S. Department of Defense. For background information of this Board, see Defense
Science Board Report-More Changes Called for in "The Future of GPS," http://www.gpsworld.com/
gpsworld/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=267154 (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
15. THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 9.
16. Id. at 13.
17. Id at 13, 72.
18. Id. at 17, 50, 76. There are separate regional and global networks of civil signal monitor
stations operated by government and scientific organizations, which include the Global Differential GPS
(GDGPS) System and the International GPS Service (IGS). See also id. at 51-52.
19. THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 53.
20. Id. at 54.
21. Id. at 22.
22. Id. at 12. 70.
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organized to the sufficient level to justify their needs exceeding that of the
military. 23 The means of alternative governance structures to avoid such
perception has been investigated, but the Report adds that such drastic
change requires the cooperation of the U.S. Legislature and Executive
Branch, as well as GPS users.24
Fourthly, although unspecified in the Report, there is a perceived
absence of service guarantee and liability mechanism. Examples include
aviation accidents or oil tanker wrecks due to signal interruptions or
failures. The liability mechanisms are deemed incompatible with the GPS
military objective and the U.S. government does not wish to incur the addi-
tional cost of potential liability given that the United States is providing the
GPS free of direct charge and paying $200,000,000.00-$300,000,000.00 a
year to maintain the GPS and make improvements.25 As to accountability,
the Report simply states that each Department is separately accountable for
exploiting GPS for their unique missions.
26
Fifthly, the perception of the GPS as a necessity for military and
security reasons led to the U.S. government's opposition to sharing the
control and operation of the GPS with anyone else.27 This particular
perception is becoming increasingly problematic in light of its accelerating
use for civilian purposes. "[T]he U.S. [Department of Defense] did not
foresee that its GPS would be hijacked by the civilian economy., 28 The
perception that the GPS is being dominated by the military is reflected in
the PNT National Policy, which requires the Secretary of State to notify "as
appropriate" foreign governments and international organizations of
interference with the GPS services caused by foreign government or
29
commercial activities.
Sixthly, the U.S. Department of Transportation has established the
Navigation Information Service, which is intended to be the contact point
for civil GPS users. The Service is operated and maintained by the U.S.
Coast Guard. The Civil GPS Service Interface Committee (CGSIC) operates
as the worldwide forum for effective interaction between all civil GPS users
and the U.S. GPS authorities. The CGSIC was established to identify civil
GPS user needs in support of the Department of Transportation's GPS
"outreach" program. In fulfilling this responsibility, the CGSIC reports its
23. Id. at 70.
24. THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 12.
25. Larsen, supra note 3, at 111.
26. THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 71-72.
27. Larsen, supra note 3, at 114. For an example of some people's fear of GPS-related
military risks, thereby views of military control of GPS as necessity, see generally Irving Lachow, The
GPS Dilemma: Balancing Militar Risks and Economic Benefits, 20 INT'L SEC. 126 (1995).
28. Langhorne Bond, The GNSS Safety and Sovereignty Convention of 2000 AD, 65 J. AIR L.
& COM. 445, 447 (2000).
29. See PNT Policy, supra note 13.
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activities to the U.S. National Space-Based PNT Executive Committee.0
The meeting in 2005 was attended by about 100 people, which included
senior U.S. officials, military personnel, academics, and users.31 However,
the report of the meeting seems to indicate that the main issues discussed
are technical issues of the GPS rather than governance issues.
II. GALILEO-GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OVERVIEW
Unlike the GPS, which is solely administered by the U.S. domestic
regulatory agencies and departments, the EU's Galileo is administered by a
public-private partnership via a contractual arrangement. The EU has
established the Galileo Supervisory Authority (Authority),32 which will be
responsible for managing and regulating the public interests connected with
the European GNSS programs.
The Galileo Concessionaire (Concessionaire), a merged consortium,
whom the Authority will select, will be awarded exclusive rights to the use
of the Galileo infrastructure for twenty years.33 In return, the organization
will bear at least two-thirds of the infrastructure construction costs. The
infrastructure will be owned by the Authority under a public ownership.
The contract between the Concessionaire and Authority will clearly set out
the responsibilities, roles, and risks to be shared between the public and
private sectors. The Concessionaire will be responsible for completing the
deployment of the Galileo system, operating, and exploiting it commercial-
ly and encouraging application development. The Concessionaire is
entitled to sub-contract out various value-added services, as well as special
services such as launch services, infrastructure deployment services, and
operations and maintenance services.34
30. PETER RAMM, REPORT ON OVERSEAS TRAVEL, at 2 (2005), http://www.dpi.vic.gov.au/
CA256F310024B628/0/437D6766DD60F21ECA25714C001 1E2CE/$File/ION+2005+ConferencePete
rRamm_20050927.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
31. Id.
32. A Community agency set up by Council Regulation 1321/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 246).
33. D. Brocklebank, J. Spiller & T. Tapsell, Galileo-An Organizational Challenge for
Europe, 18 INT. J. SATELL. COMM. 259, 265 (2000) (competition policy/price control implication in
service provision needs to be considered as the Galileo Concessionaire will hold a virtual monopoly).
34. Concessionaire (Galileo Operating Company) will sub-contract out launch services to
Arianespace, infrastructure deployment to Galileo industries, and operations and maintenance to
operations company, Dr. Stefan Sassen, TeleOp GmBH: Status of the Galileo Concession and the
Operations Concept, available at http://allsat.de/download/ALLSAT-allgemein/ALLSATOPEN/2006/
01_DrStefanSassenTeleOpGmbH.pdf (last visited Oct 29, 2007). See Dr. Stefan Sassen,
Managing Director, TeleOp GmbH: Status of the Galileo Concession and the Operations Concept,
(June 22, 2006).
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Galileo is the first European public-private partnership and the first
public infrastructure owned by the European institutions. 35 It has already
launched its first experimental satellite GIOVE A in December 2005 and
the first four of thirty satellites are scheduled to be launched in 2008.
Galileo will have five distinct service groups-free to air Open Service,
authenticated Safety-of-Life Service, encrypted and guaranteed Commercial
Service, encrypted and jamming-resistant Public Regulated Service, and
near real-time Search and Rescue Service.36 The Concessionaire was
selected in June 2005 with the main terms of the contract expected to be
fixed by the end of 2006. The final agreement is expected to be signed by
the end of 2007.
The EU has signed several international cooperation agreements with
China, Israel, Ukraine, India, Morocco, and South Korea, among others.37
They aim to create a framework for cooperation on a wide scale for
industrial, research, and scientific activities (standardization in particular),
regional integrity monitoring, and financial participation in Galileo. For
example, the first three agreements with China concern the development of
fishery application systems, special ionospheric studies for Galileo regional
augmentation services, and standardization of location based services.38
The public-private partnership raises a crucial issue of whether the
contract can ensure profitability to the private company despite the
contract's objective to pursue public interests. The contract is a crucial
instrument that ensures that the administrative duties do not extend beyond
the boundaries of the traditional legal principles and values of the GAL.
This is necessary because it lacks the mechanisms available in the domestic
setting, such as parliamentary or judicial supervision.
While the fact that the Galileo Concession contract is still under
negotiation necessitates speculation in this article to a certain extent, the
following analysis can highlight the minimum standards required for the
contract and Galileo governance structure to be deemed as sufficiently
accountable under GAL.
First, the contract needs to include the Galileo system's plan to be
continuously monitored, and the results to be made available to users and
35. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council: Taking stock of the GALILEO programme, at 2, COM (2006)
272 final (July 6, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energytransport/galileo/documents/
doc/commjpdf corn_2006_0272_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
36. EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, supra note 10, at 22-23.
37. Commission of the European Communities, supra note 35, at 9.
38. Guan Xiaofeng, Nation inks three more Galileo contracts, CHINA DAILY, July 29, 2005, at
2, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/englishldoc/2005-07/29/content_464340.htm (last visited
Oct. 29, 2007). See also China Signs 3 Contracts Involving Galileo Program, SATNEWS DAILY, July 29,
2005, http-J/www.satnews.com/stories2005/1077.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
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customers of Galileo-based applications. 39 The contract also needs to entail
the Authority's promises that the users will receive the timely warning in a
case of failure of the signals and the Authority's right to check the
performance while obligating the Concessionaire to submit a regular report
to the Authority about the performance. Such performance measurements
require the formulation of the accepted standard for which the performance
can be compared against. The Authority plans to formulate globally
recognized signal standards in consultation with international organizations,
such as those dealing with air and maritime navigations, and the relevant
national authorities.40
Secondly, the contract is also likely to include the right to audit the
Concessionaire's claims of expenses and costs by either the Authority itself
or through the European Court of Auditors or an authorized representative.
In turn, the Concessionaire may also be required to submit its financial
report to the Authority regularly.
Thirdly, the contract needs to specify a liability procedure and mechan-
ism. The liability procedure can be based in part upon existing agreements
(such as the Chicago Convention for Civil Aviation), new contractual
arrangements, or commercial liability insurance and mutual insurance (such
as superfunds for oil spills).4' It has been reported that the two sides have
agreed that insurance will cover the major portion of the risk through a
contingency/compensation fund.42 Yet, there is disagreement over uninsured
liabilities, with the Authority wanting the risk shared while the
Concessionaire is resisting any exposure to open-ended liabilities.43
Potential claimants in cases of (uninsured) liability include primary
(e.g. aircraft operators), secondary (passengers), and tertiary (third party)
claimants as well as defendants, which may include the EU, European
Space Authority, national governments, and their various instrumentalities
and other related international/regional organizations. Equipment designers
and manufacturers may also be liable if it is proven that defects caused an
accident.44 Liability could also extend to other states, which agreed and
authorized the use of Galileo for a safety critical application in its own
jurisdiction, thereby impliedly accepting responsibility to ensure within
reason that the system is capable of satisfying that application.45  The
39. EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, supra note 10, at 34.
40. Id. at 21.
41. D. Brocklebank et al., supra note 33, at 261.
42. Progress Amid Criticism: Challenging the Galileo Obstacle Course, I n.7 INSIDE GNSS
16 (2006), available at httpJ/www.insidegnss.com/node/i 18 (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
43. Id.
44. Brocklebank et al., supra note 41, at 267.
45. Id.
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contract needs to formulate a mechanism that clearly sets out response-
bilities for each party involved.
Fourthly, a method of administration via contract raises a rather unique
question of dispute resolution. While the contract would set out the
governing law in case of a dispute, it would likely have reference to a
commercial arbitration in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce or a similar body for
a relatively quick resolution of a dispute rather than the European Court of
Justice. In a case of arbitration, the contract may also specify the
arbitrational award to be final and binding on the parties.
Fifthly, the contract is likely to have a confidentiality clause pro-
hibiting disclosure of commercially and technically sensitive information to
the third party or public in general.
Sixthly, the contract is likely to forbid the Concessionaire from
transferring its contractual rights and obligations to other commercial
actors; however, sub-contracting will be expressly allowed, possibly at the
approval of the Authority. Sub-contracting out services such as certifica-
tion of Galileo suitability for a particular service may be beneficial in that it
brings in independent third party assessment of Galileo.46 However, sub-
contracting in general raises a question of to what extent the Concessionaire
will be responsible for any liabilities incurred by the sub-contractors.
Seventhly, the contract will include a right of cancellation, which
raises a question of feasibility of such an option, given the extremely high
capital cost and expertise involved, as well as public relations matter for
Galileo who will engage in competition with the GPS.
Administration by contracting out also raises important theoretical
questions from the perspectives of the GAL. The contract, or at least the
relevant portion of it, regulates the Concessionaire's activity for the benefit
of the public as final recipients who may enter into a separate chain of
contractual relationship with the Concessionaire. The delegation theory of
contract law in this kind of chain of contracts is not directly applicable to
this particular case because it is doubtful that the interests of principals
regulate and the final beneficiaries are aligned. The emergence of Galileo
and its governance structure highlight a need for rethinking of the grounds
of regulation under public-private partnership through a contract model in
order to accommodate accountability questions at the global level.
46. See generally European GNSS Supervisory Authority, Tender Specifications Attached to
Invitation to Tender: Invitation to Tender No. Tren/GSA/001/2006 Concerning Support to Galileo
Certification, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energytransport/tenders/doc/2006/s148_159082_
specifications en.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
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III. ACCOUNTABILITY
A definition of accountability at the level of GAL is contested. While
the analysis of the exact meaning of this concept is out of scope of this
article, it is important to remember not to blindly apply accountability
norms and mechanisms available in the domestic setting to the global
setting.47 Keohane points out that the terms of accountability, such as the
standards of accountability to be employed, who the accountability holders
should be, and whose interests the accountability holders should represent,
are uncertain and therefore ought to be subject to principled and informed
public deliberation.48 There seems to be a definite shortfall in this regard
for both the GPS and Galileo. There is no direct avenue available for public
opinion input in the Committee governing the GPS to discuss any aspects
related to accountability, let alone the terms of it. The Galileo contract is
binding for twenty years, which makes it difficult to accommodate this need
to revise dynamic notions of accountability and public discussion over it
without disrupting certainty of the contract.
While the GPS and Galileo may be viewed as satisfying internal
accountability owed to its national citizens to some extent through delega-
tion, the most notable aspect about the GPS and Galileo in relation to
external accountability at the global level is the fundamental underlying
unequal power relationship. Keohane points out that accountability is a
power relationship and to be held accountable is to have one's autonomy
and one's power over others constrained.49 Without such constraint, it may
lead to disregard of important societal interests by these bodies. The GPS
and Galileo are in unique positions because they enjoy technological
duopolies (except GLONASS) over the PNT systems in the world. The
resulting unequal power relationships make it difficult to hold them
accountable to the users. Further, Galileo faces a problem of how to take
account of important affected societal interests through a means of contract.
GPS faces a problem of how to take account of non-U.S. societal interests
through its domestic regulatory agencies and departments.
To help analyze accountability, Grant and Keohane raise seven
different types of accountability at the global level,50 for which three of
them are relevant for this article's purpose. The first is market account-
ability. Consumers of services are expected to hold the administrative body
accountable with a threat of loss of access to capital. The emergence of
47. See Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability in World Politics, 29 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD.
75, 85 (2006).
48. Alien Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,
20 ETHics & INT'L AFF. 405,426-27 (2006).
49. Keohane, supra note 46, at 79.
50. Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCa. REV. 29, 35 (2005).
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Galileo and resulting prospect of competition in the PNT market placed
great pressure on the GPS to improve its public image and perceived
legitimacy, which prompted the GPS internal review, as well as reform of
its governance structure that led to formation of the Committee. Competi-
tion in the lucrative PNT market would put much market pressure on both
bodies to be perceived as responding to indirect or direct public demand for
accountability.
The second is peer accountability. The effect is similar to the market
accountability, except the pressure stems not from consumers but from peer
organizations. The presence of GPS, Galileo, and GLONASS, as well as
possible entrance from other countries like China or India may result in
each body pressing and criticizing each other to act in accordance with
express or implied standards in relation to accountability for the apparent
trust and coherency of the industry as a whole.
The third is public reputational accountability.5' With the increasing
impact and awareness of the PNT systems among the public and the
increasing number of actors in the industry, the importance of joining the
"club" of GNSS for reputation, prestige, and self-esteem is likely to assert
more implication for expected level of accountability and corresponding
pressure on the GPS and Galileo.
IV. LIABILITY-LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The availability of avenues for obtaining compensation in a case of
liability incurred as a result of the administrative bodies' action or inaction
constitutes legal accountability under GAL. The standards of legal account-
ability can include factors like the standing of an aggrieved party in a legal
accountability mechanism, availability of forum to meaningfully present the
party's case, the extent of the binding effect, and enforceability of such
mechanism and relative resources between the parties.
The GPS does not have its own legal accountability mechanism where
a claim for liability may be processed. But while sovereign immunity
prevents tort claims against the U.S. government, there are several statutes
51. Id. at 37. Keohane calls these three accountability mechanisms as diffuse accountability in
contrast to specific accountability as the former lacks power to constrain action by others. See generally
Memorandum from Robert 0. Keohane for the Nov. 17 Accountability Workshop: Global Administra-
tive Law Seminar, at 2-3 (Nov. 1, 2006), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/kingsburyb/fall06/
globalization/Keohane%20comment*/*20on%20stewart%20memo%2OlI-l-06.doc (last visited Mar. 22,
2008). On the other hand, Stewart calls them "other responsiveness-promoting measures" that can
promote accountability rather than actual mechanisms of accountability. See Richard B. Stewart,
Accountability and the Discontents of Globalization: US and EU Models for Regulatory Governance
(Sept. 20, 2006) (unpublished paper, available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/kingsburyb/fall06/
globalization/Stewart,Accountability9-20-06.doc) (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). The paper will focus on
the overlapping substantial meanings behind these mechanisms and measures.
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under which the U.S. has waived immunity. The most significant statute is
the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) 2 Under the FTCA the government
has waived immunity for claims of money damages where the loss was
caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission of a government
employee acting within the scope of his office.53 Claims must be brought in
federal court, but liability is established under the law for the jurisdiction
where the act occurred. However, there are three relevant exceptions to the
waiver of sovereign immunity by the U.S. government.
The first area where the U.S. government does not waive immunity is
where the act involves a discretionary function of the government.54 Epstein
points out that the case law has established that this discretionary function
is separate from operational function. 55 In the GPS's case, once the U.S.
government provides a GPS signal for a particular purpose, it may be liable
if operational failure of the signal was the proximate cause of a crash (for
example negligent degrading of the signal without notice to civil users).
However, the issue in the context of GPS would be whether the
relevant decision leading to a negligent action is the one made by a high
government official or a lowly computer operator. 6 Ehrhart opines that in a
situation where negligence results from the wrongful uploading of the data
from the U.S. station to a satellite, given that a GPS uploading of data is not
based upon an underlying judgment by another person, the relevant
decision-maker would be the operator who actually uploads the data.57 In
such a case, the scope and type of discretionary power given to the relevant
employee will be relevant considerations.5 8  The broader the scope, the
more likely it is that it would be viewed as a discretionary function. Also, if
the relevant decision-making process involved broad public policy
considerations made by a decision-maker with high status, or served a
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000). See generally Jonathan M. Epstein, Global Positioning
System (GPS): Defining the Legal Issues of Its Expanding Civil Use, 61 J. AIR L. & CoM. 243 (1995).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000).
55. For example, in Ingham v. United States, 373 F.2d 227, 237 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert. denied
389 U.S. 931 (1967), the Second Circuit held that the failure of an air-traffic controller to provide
accurate, current weather forecasts was the proximate cause of a crash and was not a discretionary
function. The court reasoned that while the establishment of an air traffic control system was a
discretionary act, once the system was established, employees were required to act in a reasonable
manner, and the government was liable for failure to do so. Epstein, supra note 51, at 265. See also
Brandon Eric Ehrhart, A Technological Dream Turned Legal Nightmare: Potential Liability of the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for Operating the Global Positioning System, 33
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 371, 391-415 (2000) (analyzing case law on FTCAs Discretionary Function
exception).
56. Ehrhart, supra note 54, at 416.
57. Id. at 419-20.
58. Ehrhart applies the Berkovitz test from Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538
(1988). See Ehrhart, supra note 54, at 417-20.
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unique government function, it may also be viewed as a discretionary
function.
59
A GPS operator would be merely following a prescribed procedure to
upload data to satellites, which does not require broad public policy
considerations in the process. 60 Also, he or she is unlikely to be a high-
ranked officer.61 However, because Ehrhart views the GPS as primarily
serving a military function, he deems that a GPS operator's action serves a
unique government function thereby saving the U.S. government from a
claim. 62 In my opinion, Ehrhart's view was probably influenced by a pre-
2000 GPS practice where civil signal had been purposefully downgraded by
the U.S. government to preserve integrity of military signals. However,
now that the levels of signals are the same for the military and civilians, and
that civilian usage of the GPS is accelerating, there is a scope for the
management of the GPS to be viewed as a commercial function rather than
a unique government action. Nevertheless, Ehrhart points out that the U.S.
court may still support the U.S. government and prevent a claim because
such a claim may force the government to reveal crucial information about
operation of the GPS that may have security and military implications.63
The second area where the U.S. government does not waive immunity
involves claims arising in a foreign country, 64 which raises a question about
the status of a claim over an accident or loss suffered in non-U.S. country.
The crucial issue is the meaning of "arising." It may not always refer to the
scene of the accident or where an injury has occurred, but where an error
causing the injury has occurred. This position is supported by case law,65
which suggests that the claim may be available against the U.S. government
if, for example, the error causing the accident or loss happened in the GPS
station in the U.S. while transmitting data to the satellites.
The third relevant area is where the injuries were suffered as a result of
combat activities of the armed forces during a time of war.67 This exception
59. Id. at 417-18.
60. Id. at 419.
61. Id. at 420.
62. Id. at 422-23.
63. Ehrhart, supra note 54, at 422-23.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000).
65. See In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975), in which the
fact that a plane crash occurred in France did not bar suit in the United States because the "act"
(wrongful approval of a certificate of inspection) was alleged to have taken place in California. See also
Epstein, supra note 51, at 265-66; Ehrhart, supra note 54, at 386-89 (analysis of a list of cases including
United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1949), Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 3 (1962)
and Sarni v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1979), which held that the relevant "arising"
refers to a situs of the negligent act and not the locus of the injury).
66. Ehrhart, supra note 54, at 390-91.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (2000).
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may completely absolve the U.S. government from liability under the
FTCA if it degrades or turns off the GPS signal in a time of national
emergency.
68
Hence, a liability claim against the U.S. government may be available
legally under the FTCA. However, the establishment of causation of loss
from the integrity of the GPS signal may be difficult to prove under the
statute, 69 especially for a private party claimant. The prospect of a lengthy
and expensive court battle in foreign court would also deter many non-U.S.
claimants. The availability of signal histories and data, which have direct
implication for transparency, is going to have strong impact on the
claimant's chance of success as well.
As well as the FTCA, there are other avenues to lodge a claim against
the U.S. government. 7° Epstein refers to Foreign Claims Act (FCA) and
Military Claims Act (MCA).72 These two statutes do not waive sovereign
immunity per se, but rather provide an administrative means for individuals
to file claims for damages caused by the U.S. armed forces. The FCA
allows agencies to settle claims by inhabitants of foreign countries for non-
combat damages caused by members or civilian employees of the U.S.
armed services, whether or not they are acting within the scope of their
official capacity. While the U.S. has been very liberal in paying claims, the
government has no legal obligation to do so. The MCA provides similar
relief for those U.S. citizens and others that do not fall under the FCA, but
agencies have typically required that the military member causing the injury
was acting in an official capacity, acted negligently, and that the act was not
a discretionary function.73 Overall, these statutes do not guarantee the
compensation for liabilities arising from the mismanagement of the GPS,
and they are only confined to military situations.
Epstein goes on to examine whether there is a measure of legal
accountability for mismanagement of the GPS by the United States under
international law. While there is no multilateral treaty directly applicable to
hold the U.S. liable for damage caused by an incorrect signal,74 the Conven-
tion on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 197275
68. Epstein, supra note 51, at 266.
69. Id.
70. See id at 266-67 for possible suits under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§
741-52 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 109-304, § 6(c), 120 Stat. 1517 (2006), against state negligent
or wrongful acts or omissions, which may be relevant for maritime accidents or losses caused by
negligence over management of the GPS.
71. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2000).
72. 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (2000).
73. Epstein, supra note 51, at 268.
74. Id. at 268.
75. See generally Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 178, 1972 U.S.T. LEXIS 262.
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imposes strict liability for those who place objects in space when damage is
caused by such object on the surface of the Earth or to an aircraft in flight.76
This Convention seems unlikely to be useful for the claimants because the
language of the Convention as well as deliberations on the Convention and
commentators all suggest that the Convention was meant to cover only
direct physical damage at the earth's surface caused by a malfunctioning
launch vehicle or a space vehicle/satellite that did not bum up on reentry.
77
The drafters did not intend to include the types of losses caused by the GPS,
which is strengthened by the fact that the GPS did not exist in 1972.
The Congressional documents also indicate that the U.S. interpreted the
Convention to not include "indirect damages" or electronic interference.78
Hurwitz also doubts whether it would apply to economic damages caused by
direct broadcast satellites or use of remote sensing to exploit another
country's natural resources. 7 9  Even if an interpretation favorable to the
claimant is adopted, the Convention will still play a limited role for the
claimants because first, the U.S. government may refuse to abide by the
Convention for floodgate concerns and second, only the state parties would
be able to bring a claim, not an individual.80
As for Galileo, insurance schemes may be the primary mechanism of
legal accountability. However, uninsured liabilities may lead to a dispute
between the Authority and Concessionaire as to who ought to take the
responsibility. As speculated above, the contract may have a dispute
resolution clause referring to arbitration. In such a case, questions arise as
to the mandate and legitimacy of arbitrators making such important
decisions concerning the legal accountability of an administrative body with
such extensive impacts and influences on personal lives. There may be
further questions about to whom the arbitrators are accountable, and the
arbitration may also have implications for public participation and
transparency especially when they are conducted in private under private
commercial experts rather than judges. Such a problem may be resolved if
the contract sets out quick procedures for establishing a special EU court in
case of disputes.
Another moot point is the extent of legal accountability faced by sub-
contractors. The insurance scheme of Galileo ought to include liabilities
76. 1972 U.S.T. LEXIS at 5.
77. Epstein, supra note 51, at 269.
78. Epstein, supra note 51, at 269 (citing Kevin K. Spradling, The International Liability
Ramifications of the US. NA VSTAR Global Positioning System, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 93, 97 (1990)).
79. BRUCE A. HURWIT, STATE LIABILITY FOR OUTER SPACE ACTvrrTEs IN ACCORDANCE
wrrH THE 1972 CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS
18-19 (1992).
80. Epstein, supra note 51, at 270.
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suffered by the sub-contractors to prevent the harmed consumers from
leaving empty handed.
However, Galileo's contractual arrangement also has a value for legal
accountability in that it renders itself as a private law instrument which is
more readily accessible by the public via domestic courts or private arbitral
bodies. Also, such contractual method provides flexibility to pursue
innovative approaches for legal accountability in comparison to dealing
with bureaucratic actors as under the GPS.
Another form of legal accountability for Galileo may be the Authority
terminating the contract with the Concessionaire for failure to observe
provisions implementing public interests and values. However, the
feasibility of such an option is in doubt given extremely high capital costs
and technical expertise involved in the Galileo project.
V. NON-DECISIONAL PARTICIPATION
Non-decisional participation may be viewed as a part of accountability
mechanism or a measure that promotes responsiveness of the relevant body
and thereby promotes accountability. It typically involves ability to attend
meetings where a pending decision over the relevant subject matter is dis-
cussed, ability to submit an argument, ability to participate in consultation
initiated by an organization, and ability to vote in the actual decision.
Participation may increase responsiveness of the relevant organization by
supplying new viewpoints and information about the subject matter.
Depending on the context, it may be a substitute or complement of account-
ability.
Though it is often difficult to analyze what really counts as meaningful
participation in the governance of administrative bodies, it is relatively a
simple exercise for the GPS in that the GPS does not envisage any kind of
public participation in its management. The contact points provided by the
GPS such as one in the Department of Transportation and CGSIC meetings
deal with technical issues involved in the operation of GPS rather than its
management and governance issues. This avoidance primarily stems from
the U.S. government's perception on the nature of GPS as a crucial military
instrument.
As for Galileo, the form and extent of public participation would
depend on the terms of the contract. This would entail questions of the
form of participation and who is entitled to speak for the users in the
contractually-guaranteed public participatory forums and consultation
meetings. However, one shortfall is already evident in this regard--there
has been no direct public participation in the contract design, which would
have allowed broader public participation in the shaping of the contract
terms and evaluation of their performance. This aspect is especially
important in that this contract would be difficult to be terminated by either
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party because of high the capital costs and expertise involved. Moreover,
both the GPS and Galileo would face difficulty in providing avenues for
participation for foreign users let alone domestic users.
One may view ability to bring a lawsuit against the U.S. government
and the Galileo Supervisory Authority/Concessionaire as a form of partici-
pation. But the narrow scope of the FTCA and the anticipated lengthy and
costly legal trials also undermine such avenue of participation.
Another big dilemma for non-decisional participation for the PNT
system is over the technical expertise required for such a system. The
technical complexity involved is such that reasoned deliberation on the
governing structure quickly encounters technological issues. This requires
vibrant civil society to exchange questions and answers to translate these
81technical issues into a form easily comprehensible to users.
VI. TRANSPARENCY
Transparency may also be viewed as a part of the accountability
mechanism or simply as a measure that promotes responsiveness of the
relevant body and thereby promotes accountability. Transparency provides
information to the public necessary for evaluation of performance 82 and
taking of remedial actions as well as promoting peer, reputational, and
market pressure. It also enables ongoing dialogue about the role of the
particular administrative bodies in the world. However, it is also important
that there be a means available for such information to be interpreted in a
way that is easily understandable to the public. This again requires a role of
civil society.
The GPS governance structure reveals shortfalls in regard to trans-
parency as well. Due to the perception of its nature as a military instru-
ment, no record of the Committee's meetings is made public. As to each
Department's projects and plans using the GPS, the Committee's National
Policy only provides for the Department to give appropriate information to
the Committee's Coordination Office to ensure interagency transparency
about the PNT system, but does not mention anything about public
transparency. 83 It may be possible that transparency is promoted by each
Department making the information of the Department's use and
management of the GPS technology in its Departmental project available,
but it would still not reveal information about the overarching governing
structure and management of the GPS system in the Committee.
On the other hand, Galileo's public-private partnership faces negative
implication for transparency due to a confidentiality clause in the contract.
81. Keohane, supra note 46, at 85.
82. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 47, at 427-28.
83. See PNT Policy, supra note 13.
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While commercially and technically sensitive information needs confidenti-
ality protection, it is important that the contract specifies avenues for infor-
mation regarding governance and management aspect to be made available
to the public. Such information may include auditing and financial reports
of the Concessionaire, which also has positive impact on fiscal account-
ability.
There are some standards that may count as constituting transparency
under GAL for both GPS and Galileo. First, monitoring of performance by
the bodies and independent third parties and availability of results would
make the system more transparent. As examined above, the U.S. govern-
ment has only been monitoring the military signals and has not utilized the
independent civilian monitoring stations. Only when the Committee adopts
the Report's recommendations of monitoring of civil signals by the
government as well as by independent civilian monitoring stations, will it
meet this particular standard of transparency. On the other hand, Galileo
promises regular monitoring over every signal, and given that it is public-
private partnership it is expected to make use of independent civilian
monitoring stations.
Secondly, there must be clear performance benchmarks (in terms of
signal integrity among others) for which the monitored information can be
compared and its compliance measured against. The U.S. government has
established its own Civil Performance Standard several years ago by its
own experts. Galileo plans to formulate an internationally-accepted
standard by discussing it with relevant international organizations and
national authorities. Disregarding its technical suitability, the Civil Perfor-
mance Standard may lack apparent objectivity in the eyes of users, and the
GPS should formulate the international performance standard in coopera-
tion with Galileo and other relevant parties. The results of measurements of
performance against this standard ought to be made publicly available: The
Report recommends that the PNT Committee should produce a weekly
assessment of its signals and Galileo should accommodate this requirement
in the contract as well.
It is important to note that the dilemma of expertise is also existent for
transparency. The regulatory complexity as a result of technological issues
involved means that availability of information is not easily translatable to
reasoned dialogue and review by the political or judicial body, let alone the
general public. The role of civil society is again important especially in the
PNT context, because the inequality in power relationship between the U.S.
and EU on one hand and the rest of world on the other is such that its gaps
are not easily bridgeable by any reasonable means.
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VII. LEGITIMACY
Legitimacy is not a part of the accountability mechanism. A suitable
balance of accountability may lead to perceptions of legitimacy of an
administrative body. But it may be useful to discuss legitimacy of the GPS
and Galileo in the public's view for the purpose of this article.
Conditions of legitimacy are ever-changing as standards and contexts
are subject to change all the time. When perception of legitimacy increases,
public support of the body increases. 84 Until the emergence of Galileo,
legitimacy mattered little for the GPS because the users could not withhold
its usage of the monopolistic GPS. But the advent of Galileo opens a new
era of battle for legitimacy in the PNT arena under GAL.
It is also important to note that being legitimate and being perceived as
legitimate are two different things.85 The latter may be as crucial as the
former. For example, while the GPS's current structure and status may be
legitimate because of its military character, ironically its very military
character prompts the public to perceive the GPS's governance structure as
somewhat less than legitimate. The same point may apply to Galileo as
well. While governance via contract may be legitimate, reflecting its
public-private partnership, it may also prompt the public to perceive the EU
as only interested in economic benefit over public interests.
A requirement that the relevant body receive accreditation from an
independent organization may also promote legitimacy of the system. The
PNT Committee has its own Advisory Board in a form of NASA, which
may not be totally independent but at least would provide top-level
accreditation of the GPS system. The Galileo contract would need to
entrust this task to European Space Agency. Because the subject matter
deals with a highly technical matter, it is difficult to find a suitable
independent organization to give accreditation about the system. This again
reveals the unique context of the PNT system from the perspectives of
GAL.
VIII. ALTERNATIVE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FOR THE GNSS
There may be several explanatory variables for the development,
adoption, and functioning of different accountability mechanisms in the
context of the GPS and Galileo. Among them is competitiveness in the
PNT arena. More contestable the GPS's position is by Galileo, more likely
that the GPS will defer to the public expectation of accountability and vice
versa. Another explanatory variable is voluntariness on the part of users.
The opportunity cost of exiting from the PNT arena determines how much
84. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 47, at 406.
85. Id at 407.
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genuine pressure the users can impose on the GPS and Galileo to be
accountable.
Also, deference to internal structure of a particular administrative body
is an important explanatory variable. For the GPS, more deference paid to
its internal military character means it is more likely to be captured by a
subset (the Department of Defense) rather than being capable of serving and
accommodating a wider range of views and interests. Equally for Galileo,
more deference paid to its Concessionaire and economic interests means it
is more likely to be captured by the Concessionaire at the possible expense
of public interest.
The last explanatory variable to be mentioned is technological
advancement, which has implications for an unequal playing field. The
level of technological advancement available at the time may determine the
extent of possible or potential accountability. For example, in the 1990s,
the level of technological advancement was such that the GPS as a near
monopoly (subject to then-rapidly declining GLONASS of Russia) could
freely ignore any calls for accountability, transparency or public participa-
tion. However, with the development of technology, other actors are able to
enter the playing field on a relatively equal basis, thereby leading to more
responsiveness for such calls.
These explanatory variables indicate what kind of alternative governance
structure is available and suitable for the GPS, Galileo, and GNSS in general.
The rise of Galileo and re-rise of GLONASS of Russia, as well as possible
developments of PNT systems by India, China and other countries, 86 and
international cooperation agreements being signed between Galileo/GPS and
other countries in relation to the development of the Galileo/GPS-related
projects,8 7 necessitates some speculation about the future of the GNSS88 and its
most suitable alternative governance structure. 89 Among the options available,
86. For example, the Indian Space Research Organization announced plans to build an
independent satellite navigation system compatible with GPS. See Next-Generation Air Traffic
Controlled by GPS, 17, no.6 GPS WORLD 14, 17 (2006), available at http://www.nxtbook.com/
nxtbooks/questex/gps0806/index.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
87. For example, the United States signed a joint statement with Japan on Nov. 18, 2004 and
Russia on Dec. 14, 2004. Ripple & Vidal, supra note 9, at 411. The agreement with Russia called for
cooperation to maintain compatibility and promote interoperability of GPS and GLONASS for civil
users worldwide (although lack of visibility in the results). Id.
88. For an example of a third party state's view on joining GNSS-Galileo, see Werner
Enderle, Miles Moody, Yanming Feng & Andrew Parfitt, Initiatives of the Australian Cooperative
Research Centre for Satellite Systems/Queensland University of Technology for the Involvemet in the
European GNSS-Galileo, available at http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/gnss2004unsw/ENDERLE,%
20Wemer0/o20P228.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
89. Notably, in June 2004, the United States and European Union signed an agreement on the
GPS-Galileo cooperation, including a promise to work on technical compatibility between the two
systems. Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS Satellite-based
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there are two most notable ones, namely, governance via market competition
on the one hand, and governance via multilateral institution on the other.
Governance via multilateral institution has intuitive appeal. Since the
GPS is entrenched in a domestic governance scheme and Galileo is
entrenched in business interests to a significant extent via its public-private
partnership, a multilateral institution may be able to bring them out onto a
relatively clean platter. A multilateral institution is designed to make states
accountable to each other, if not to outsiders, by institutionalizing a pattern
of questioning and making it possible to withhold approval from coercive
actions. It may impose serious reputational accountability on each other. It
also typically has fiscal and supervisory accountability to member states.
The top management will often be subject to electoral accountability to
such states. Legal accountability will also be satisfied to some extent with
the Convention specifying liability provisions. More fundamentally, a
multilateral institution may allow such GPS and Galileo systems to be
viewed as "international public good."
However, specifically for these reasons of imposition of accountability
with most notable emphasis on liability provision, the U.S. or EU is
unlikely to be willing to initiate, let alone join, such a multilateral institu-
tion, 90 and any multilateral institution on the GNSS without the U.S. or EU
is meaningless in the current period. Hence, if a multilateral institution is to
be designed to their taste, Bond suggests that their guarantee to provide the
civil signal continuously to all must be accompanied by specified excep-
tions, such as military causes.91 There also would be a need to include a
recognition that GNSS signals are subject to interruptions that cannot all be
controlled by providers or user nations so that the provider will not be
responsible for such.92
While a multilateral institution with such a design may be able to
attract participation from the U.S. and EU, in my opinion its benefit from
GAL perspectives is highly doubtful. A problem lies in inherent power
inequality between those who have technology and those who have not.
While a multilateral institution may appear to increase the role of GAL via
an apparent increase in public participation and transparency, there is a
significant risk in my mind that the whole process is subject to manipula-
tion by the "haves" in such a way that it only reflects their interests. The
near elimination of potential liability will also ensure further entrenchment
and institutionalization of this unequal power relationship, and the
multilateral institution in the context of international law (where a domestic
Navigation Systems and Related Applications, June 26, 2004, Hein's No. KAV 7214. On future
cooperation/cohabitation between GPS and Galileo, see Ripple & Vidal, supra note 9, at 410.
90. Larsen, supra note 3, at 117.
91. Bond, supra note 28, at 449.
92. Id. at 450.
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concept of checks and balances is almost non-existent) will merely reflect
that. The concept of "international public good," however appealing as it
may sounds, is difficult to be materialized here because producers of the
PNT system enjoy exclusive military, economic, and scientific advantages
over the rest stemming from the exclusive ownership of the PNT system
that they will not relinquish.
On the other hand, governance via market competition has potential
benefits. International cooperation on standardization and certification of
products and services, as well as cooperation on performance assessment
and monitoring are achievable not only via an all-encompassing multilateral
institution but via a much less significant and narrow-scoped body like a
joint technical office,93 which will be subject to less manipulation. Also, by
employing a market mechanism, it can accommodate explanatory variables
of accountability mechanisms mentioned above in a positive way from the
perspectives of GAL.
For example, a market governance structure creates market account-
ability that would make the PNT arena more competitive and contestable than
in a case of multilateral institution. Also, from the users' perspective, the
opportunity cost of exiting from one system is not as huge as under the
governance via a multilateral institution because in a free market, Galileo or
GPS is likely to provide a good alternative to each other. Moreover, market
accountability will press the providers to defer more to external pressure
rather than to its particular internal structure, whether it is military character
or private economic interest. A prospect of competition in a lucrative market
would deter them from hiding behind their particular internal structures
against the calls for more accountability. Hence, the military character of the
GPS or difficulty of demanding legal accountability from the GPS is going to
be a lesser problem when the governance structure of the GNSS leaves it to a
market. It is expected that the commercial consumers (who would be well
aware of these implications) would seek better alternatives in Galileo or other
oncoming PNT systems as a part of the GNSS.
A fact of power inequality stemming from ownership of technology
may not change under the market mechanism but it is also a case under a
multilateral institution. The users are somewhat fortunate that there are at
least two providers with more to come on the horizon. The appeal of
market mechanism lies in its ability to tear up "haves" and make them
compete against each other, whereas a multilateral institution is more likely
to lead to a strong brotherhood among "haves."
93. See Ripple & Vidal, supra note 9, at 412.
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X. CONCLUSION
The article has provided overviews of the drastically contrasting
governance structures of the GPS and Galileo. The GPS and Galileo reveal
or may reveal shortfalls in its structure to meet the dynamic standards of
accountability under GAL. The article pointed to underlying unequal
power relationship between the producers and users, which stem from the
exclusive ownership of technology, as the important factor shaping the
extent of accountability met by producers and demanded by users.
The analysis of the PNT system gives a lesson for analysis under GAL.
It is that every administrative arena, industry, and body that is unique and
different. In the PNT system, complex technology and a market of duopoly
with contrasting governance structures shaped the analysis in its unique
way. GAL needs to be aware of this uniqueness, and rather than treating it
as an exercise of standard-application, it needs to be prepared to analyze
one issue deeply and thoroughly to find explanatory variables working
under the surface of the structure.
One last note about the GPS and Galileo's apparent shortcomings of
accountability standards is that the advancement of technology may be the
only answer that can provide a complete solution. For example, when the
technology is sufficiently advanced, the GPS may be able to escape from its
military character by developing a completely segregated and strengthened
military signal. Many more countries could formulate their own PNT
systems, leading to the formation of GNSS on a more equal playing field
basis. It will be interesting to see how technology helps GAL to solve the
problems of accountability.
POSTSCRIPT
As of June 2007, it has been recently announced that the Concession-
aire for Galileo has refused to proceed with the Contract because of the
excessive costs involved and that the EU has decided to invest 100 percent
public funds into Galileo. Yet, a portion of above analysis over public-
private partnership may still be relevant to other emerging PNT systems and
provide a useful alternative model to compare and contrast each system. It
also casts reflection on what Galileo could have been and what Galileo
turns out to be in terms of serving GAL norms.
Han
